One Kurdish Peace Deal Could Ignite Another Middle Eastern Conflict | OilPrice.com
James Durso
James D. Durso is the Managing Director of Corsair LLC, a supply chain consultancy. In 2013 to2015, he was the Chief Executive Officer of AKM…
Trending Discussions
Premium Content
By James Durso – Oct 20, 2026, 2:00 PM CDT
- Former PKK fighters could join Iran’s Kurdish insurgency, strengthening PJAK and threatening to destabilize the Iran–Iraq–Türkiye border region.
- Iraq and Türkiye face growing security risks, as renewed Kurdish militancy could undermine Ankara’s peace process, Iraqi sovereignty, and regional energy infrastructure.
- Washington faces a strategic dilemma, as supporting Kurdish militants against Iran could alienate NATO ally Türkiye and trigger wider regional escalation.
In October 2025, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) announced it was withdrawing its fighters from Türkiye to northern Iraq as part of a peace effort with Ankara after four decades of hostilities. The statement said all PKK forces in Türkiye were being pulled back to northern Iraq “to avoid clashes or provocations.” This followed the group’s May 2025 decision to dissolve and a July ceremony where fighters burned their weapons. In late 2025 the PKK also said it had pulled out of the Zap border area in northern Iraq.
The peace process has since slowed. By May 2026, Reuters reported that Türkiye’s attempt to end the conflict had stalled, with both sides waiting for the other to act and the U.S.-Israel war on Iran complicating matters. Ankara said the PKK must fully disarm before laws can be enacted to protect or integrate former militants. PKK leaders said the group had “fulfilled its part beyond expectations.”
In August 2026, the peace process law was published in Türkiye’s Official Gazette and took effect, marking a step forward.
After the PKK announced its dissolution, some observers expected that some of its fighters might transfer to its Iranian branch, the PJAK (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê, Free Life Party of Kurdistan). PJAK issued conflicting statements, on the one hand lauding the PKK’s decision, “This is the right path…” then a week later declaring the group “will neither lay down arms nor dissolve ourselves.”
PJAK is already the most active Iranian Kurdish group, accounting for an estimated 70 percent of confirmed attacks by Iranian Kurdish opposition groups since 2014, though PJAK and Iran negotiated a ceasefire in 2011. In January 2026, however, armed Kurdish groups attempted to cross into Iran from Iraq. Related: Saudi Arabia and Asia Locked In Dispute Over 2027 Term Oil Deals
The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan reportedly has only 2,500 to 10,000 lightly armed fighters, so reinforcements could matter. Even so, these groups may have limited capacity to topple the Iranian regime alone, partly because of rifts between leftist groups such as PJAK and nationalist ones such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, as well as between groups tied to different Iraqi Kurdish political parties. The Washington Post reported in March 2026 that U.S. President Donald Trump offered support to a Kurdish operation in Western Iran, which would complicate matters for Baghdad as it is trying to recover full sovereignty and to disarm and dissolve the Iran-aligned militias.
In April 2026, Trump admitted the U.S. sent weapons to Iranian protesters via the Kurds, who kept them instead. The Kurds vehemently denied Trump’s claim, but Iran will view this as more evidence of Kurdish perfidy – CNN reported in March 2026 the American Central Intelligence Agency was working with Iranian Kurdish groups to “spark an uprising” – and of Baghdad’s inability to control its borders.
Some demobilized fighters may return to Türkiye as civilians, but others may prefer to keep fighting and join a campaign against Iran. Should Kurdish forces take up arms against Tehran, the repercussions would destabilize the Iran–Iraq–Türkiye triangle. The costs would not fall evenly:
For Iraqi Kurdistan
The Kurdistan Region will bear much of the cost. It has already been targeted by Iran and its proxies more than 1,000 times since 28 February 2026, according to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Baghdad and the KRG previously agreed to restrain PJAK. Iranian pressure could split the KRG’s two main political parties, the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), since they have different relationships with Tehran. (The PUK is closer to Tehran and the pro-Iran Iraqi militias.)
Tehran has conducted drone and missile strikes on PJAK/PKK-linked positions, framing them as threats to its border. Kurdish fighters moved into Iran in March 2026, and renewed attacks inside Iran (especially in Kurdish-majority provinces such as West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Kermanshah) would raise the likelihood of larger or more frequent Iranian strikes on Iraqi territory, diplomatic demands on Baghdad and Erbil to expel the groups, and possible ground incursions. Iranian officials have already tied stability on their western border to the <a href="https
Source: oilprice.com — article syndicated from the publisher’s feed; all rights remain with the original publisher.
