The CCS Project That Passed Every Test Except the Investment Test | OilPrice.com
Leon Stille
Leon Stille has a background in energy sciences (MSc and BSc) and is pursuing a PhD in energy policy. He currently runs his own company,…
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By Leon Stille – Oct 29, 2026, 12:00 PM CDT
- Heidelberg Materials’ Edmonton project had proven capture technology, public funding, a transport-and-storage route and an industrial carbon market—yet it still failed to reach final investment decision.
- The project shows why grants and headline carbon prices are insufficient when operating revenues, credit values, construction costs and cross-chain risks remain uncertain.
- Future CCS support should combine capital assistance with carbon contracts for difference, low-carbon product offtake and explicit allocation of transport, storage and cost-overrun risks.
Heidelberg Materials’ proposed carbon capture project in Edmonton appeared to contain almost every ingredient policymakers say a successful CCS development needs.
It targeted cement, a hard-to-abate industry where most emissions come from the chemistry of producing clinker rather than simply burning fuel. A pilot confirmed that capture was technically feasible. The Canadian government offered substantial support. A pipeline and geological storage route had been identified. Alberta already operated an industrial carbon-pricing system.
The project was supposed to capture around one million tonnes of CO? annually and become North America’s first full-scale carbon capture installation at a cement plant. It is now on hold.
That does not prove carbon capture has failed. It proves something more useful: technology readiness and policy support do not automatically create investment readiness.
The project could capture the carbon. It could not yet capture sufficiently predictable revenue.
Edmonton Passed the Technology Test
When Heidelberg and the Canadian government announced their partnership in 2023, the estimated project cost was CAD 1.36 billion. The plan combined full-scale capture with a combined heat and power system, reducing the energy penalty by recovering heat for the cement plant.
Captured CO? would move through a pipeline to the planned Open Access Wabamun Carbon Hub west of Edmonton. The design study and pilot concluded that the site could capture more than one million tonnes per year.
Public support was also substantial. Ottawa committed to working toward as much as CAD 275 million in direct project funding, including an initial CAD 49 million agreement. Canada’s refundable CCUS investment tax credit can cover 50% of eligible conventional capture equipment, with 37.5% available for eligible transport and storage equipment. This was not an unsupported laboratory concept. Related: TotalEnergies Profit Doubles as War Boosts Refining and Trading
Yet reported capital estimates later approached CAD 2 billion. More importantly, the value available for each avoided tonne weakened. Heidelberg had originally considered a policy trajectory approaching CAD 170 per tonne by 2030. Alberta’s headline industrial carbon price is CAD 95 in 2026 and now scheduled to reach CAD 115 in 2030, while tradable compliance credits have reportedly changed hands for only around CAD 40–45 per tonne.
At those values, Heidelberg concluded that proceeding was not a responsible use of shareholder capital. The pilot worked. The financial model did not.
A Carbon Price Is Not the Same as Carbon Revenue
This distinction is easily missed. The headline carbon price describes what a regulated emitter may theoretically pay for uncovered emissions. A CCS project’s investable revenue depends on what its captured tonnes actually earn or avoid over decades. Those are not necessarily the same number.
Performance benchmarks, free allocations, credit banking, alternative compliance options and an oversupply of credits can all push the effective value below the statutory price. Rules may also change after an election. For a project costing close to CAD 2 billion, uncertainty several years from now matters almost as much as today’s price.
A rational investor therefore does not model the government’s announced 2040 aspiration as guaranteed cash flow. It discounts that value for political, regulatory and market risk.
The same problem applies to capital subsidies. A grant or tax credit reduces the initial cheque, which is valuable. But a capture facility then consumes energy, solvents, maintenance and labor every year. It must also pay for compression, pipeline capacity, injection, monitoring and long-term storage. CCS creates an operating-cost stream, not just a construction invoice. A one-time subsidy can make the plant cheaper to build while leaving it uneconomic to run.
Brevik Shows What Edmonton Was Missing
The contrast inside Heidelberg’s own portfolio is instructive. In 2025, the company began capturing CO? at its Brevik cement plant in Norway, creating the world’s first full-scale carbon capture facility in the sector. The plant is designed to capture around 400,000 tonnes annually and send it by ship to Northern Lights for permanent storage below the North Sea.
Brevik did not succeed because capture technology worked better in Norway. It succeeded because Norway constructed an entire risk-sharing package around it.
The wider Longship program covers capture, shipping, a receiving terminal, pipelines and storage. The Norwegian state is providing approximately NOK 22 billion of an estimated NOK 34 billion covering construction and ten years of operation. It also assumed significant cross-chain risk and negotiated how cost increases and potential project returns would be shared.
That support is expensive and should not become the permanent model for every CCS project. But it did what early market design must do: it converted several correlated uncertainties into obligations that investors could price.
Brevik also has the beginnings of product revenue. Heidelberg sells evoZero cement using captured carbon attributes, while public authorities and high-profile buyers can create early demand for lower-carbon concrete. The green premium alone may not finance capture, but it adds a second revenue source beyond avoided carbon costs.
Edmonton largely depended on a carbon-market value that remained politically and commercially uncertain.
Canada Has Designed Part of the Answer, But Timing Matters
Canada understands the problem. The Canada Growth Fund can issue carbon contracts for difference, guaranteeing a minimum carbon or credit price for a fixed period. If the market price falls below the agreed strike price, the
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